







Success of a policy often requires both that a good policy be
adopted, and that the public or ﬁrms correctly anticipate what policy
government will adopt. This paper models a relation between com-
mittee size and the eﬀectiveness of policy, with a focus on how the
accuracy of the public’s expectations varies with the size of the gov-
ernmental committee setting policy. The paper also argues that the
demand for access by special interest groups may arise not from a de-
sire to inﬂuence policy, but from a desire to learn about government’s
likely actions.
11 Introduction
A policy will often be more successful if the public knows what the decisions
will be; a policy requiring private investment is one important example.1 Sup-
pose government makes decisions by committee, and that people learn about
a committee member’s views by listening to him, in person, on television, on
radio, or so on. Were all committee members identical, the public’s informa-
tion about the committee’s actions would not decline with the committee’s
size, and could increase. But that conclusion does not apply if the committee
members diﬀer, though their preferences are positively correlated. The larger
the committee, the less likely that the committee will follow the preferences
of any particular member, the less accurate will the public’s predictions be,
and so the less eﬀective may policy be. Suppose indeed that the beliefs of
the committee members are weakly correlated. Then if the committee has
many members, knowledge of one member’s vote predicts little about what
the committee will decide. If the committee consists of a single person, a
ﬁrm which knows his position knows the committee’s decision. On the other
hand, if the judgments of committee members show some independence from
each other, an increase in the size of the committee increases the probability
that the committee correctly estimates the state of nature, and so the more
likely it will take appropriate action. Here I explore that tradeoﬀ.
I shall suppose that the limiting factor in communication is the time of the
ﬁrm—it can hear only one committee member. An alternative assumption
is that the time of committee members is limited. Then the more members
on the committee, the more speeches they give, and the more likely that a
ﬁrm will hear the opinions of at least one member. That would argue for
larger committees. But with modern communications, and such technology
as Tivo recorders, a speech by one member can be heard by many people at
diﬀerent times, so it may be more plausible to suppose that the constraint
on information is that the ﬁrm hears only one member.
1See Wittman (1995) for the related idea that voters become informed about the issues
and candidates so that they can better plan.
22 Literature
2.1 Administrative design
My discussion of how an agency’s structure aﬀects its eﬀectiveness relates
to a large literature on administrative design.2 Recent research emphasizes
the strategic control of agencies—the current majority in the legislature, or
the president, or special interest groups, aim to design the agency so that it
will pursue particular objectives in the future. For example, the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1889 moved the Interstate Commerce Commission out of
the Department of Interior and executive branch, with the eﬀect of greatly
reducing presidential inﬂuence. Or, for another example, requirements that
a regulatory commission hold public hearing before issuing a ruling increase
the inﬂuence of public interest groups.
Another line of research considers how the agency’s design aﬀects the
quality of its decisions. This literature assumes the existence of an optimal
decision, with the agency aiming to ﬁnd it. For several reasons a commit-
tee may do better than an individual decision maker. A committee allows
each member to learn from each other (Lombardelli, Proudman and Talbot
(2002)), it increases the agency’s ﬂexibility in responding to shocks of dif-
ferent magnitudes (Mihov and Sibert (2004)), and it pools the judgment of
diﬀerent individuals.
The beneﬁts of pooling judgments arise from the Condorcet Jury Theo-
rem.3 The theorem builds on the intuition that if each committee member
has an independent probability greater than 1/2 of making the correct de-
cision, then the probability that the majority of the committee makes the
correct decision increases with the number of members; the probability ap-
proaches 1 as the number of members becomes indeﬁnitely large. Blinder
and Morgan (2000) indeed give empirical evidence for good performance of
committees.
This result suggests that committees should be very large. But decisions
are often made by small committees, say a board of directors of size nine, or
a federal regulatory commission of size three. A theoretical justiﬁcation for
small size is the decline in the quality of each member’s judgment as com-
mittee size increases; for example, high-quality people may be scarce, and so
2See Wood (2004) for a review of recent literature.
3Good surveys are in Grofman and Owen (1986) and in Miller (1986).
3the larger the committee the lower the average quality of its members.4 Or
the quality of judgment may decline because an increase in committee size
reduces each committee member’s probability of casting a decisive vote, and
so induces each to work less on the job. Such free riding makes the optimal
committee size small.5 Indeed, in a large committee, eﬀort by each member
may approach zero. Consider a committee with majority rule. Since the
probability that a member is pivotal approaches zero as the committee size
increases, the equilibrium cannot have all members informed. Uninformed
members would randomize between, say, the two alternatives under consider-
ation. The randomization reduces the probability that an informed member
is pivotal. Thus, the equilibrium with many members has no one incur the
cost of collecting information,6 and with each member voting in accord with
whatever signal he saw about the state of nature.7
2.2 Central banking
Much of my interest is in communication between the agency and the pub-
lic. This topic is of special interest in central banking, under the rubric of
“transparency.” Indeed, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Ben
Bernanke, has made it a main consideration. He writes (Bernanke (2004))
....policymaking at most central banks is done by a committee. In
the United States, nineteen people (twelve of whom get to vote at
any given meeting) serve on the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC). The diversity of views and opinions likely to exist
among the members of a large committee create further challenges
for eﬀective communication. However, vehicles do exist to help
convey the breadth of opinion on the Committee. For example,
the minutes of FOMC meetings describe the range of viewpoints
and many of the key considerations underlying policy decisions.
4For the standard result with decision makers who are endogenously endowed with
private information, see Young (1988), Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), and Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1998). Karotkin and Paroush (2003) calculate the optimal committee
size under such conditions.
5Persico (2004) discusses how voting rules aﬀect each member’s eﬀort. Mukhopadhaya
(2003) shows how a juror’s information does depend on the jury’s size.
6For a ﬁne survey of the literature on decisions by committees, see Gerling et al. (2005).
7For proof when members have identical abilities, see Austen-Smith and Banks (1996).
See also Coughlan (2000).
4In my view, releasing these minutes more promptly than is now
done would provide useful and more timely information for the
public. Although at times it feels cacophonous, the willingness
of FOMC members to present their individual perspectives in
speeches and other public forums provides the public with use-
ful information about the diversity of views and the balance of
opinion on the Committee.
Communication is important because often monetary policy will be more
eﬀective if people expect the policy to continue. Thus, improving the pre-
dictability of short-term interest rates can reduce risk premiums in asset
markets and inﬂuence shorter-term yields. And since the values of long-term
assets are aﬀected by the whole trajectory of expected short-term rates, a
central bank which aims to aﬀect long-term rates must aﬀect investors’ ex-
pectations of future short-term rates; the central bank can aﬀect expectations
by informing investors and the public about its objectives, its assessment of
the economy, and its policy strategy. A famous example of the importance of
expectations and of statements was the reaction of the newly appointed Alan
Greenspan to the stock market crash of 1987. The FOMC explicitly reas-
sured the markets that the Federal Reserve would supply suﬃcient liquidity
to support the economy.
Central banks have improved communication with the public. In partic-
ular, since 1999 the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve
Bank in the United States publishes immediately after a meeting a state-
ment explaining its decision, and its outlook for economic conditions and
monetary policy. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005a) ﬁnd that though this
increased communication reduced the uncertainty of the ﬁnancial markets
about monetary policy, even before 1999 communications from Federal Re-
serve oﬃcials were informative. Kohn and Sack (2003) corroborate that such
statements convey important information to market participants. Ehrmann
and Fratzscher (2005b) show that, as I will assume, committee members
diﬀer in their statements.
2.3 Access
My approach is the obverse of the view that individuals, or special interests,
seek access to politicians with the goal of informing politicians. A common
view has a lobbyist buy access through campaign contributions (see Herndon
5(1982), Langbein (1986), Baron (1989 ), Snyder (1990), and Austen-Smith
(1995)). This explanation, however, may be time-inconsistent: after receiv-
ing the contributions, a politician may beneﬁt little from granting access to
former contributors.
To deal with this problem, other authors study the information a politi-
cian gains from special interests. The information can concern the impor-
tance of the problem a legislator addresses (Hansen (1991), Smith (1995)),
the policy’s eﬀectiveness (Smith (1995)), and the electoral consequences of
diﬀerent policies (Kingdon (1984) and Hansen (1991)). Smith (1984) consid-
ers legislators relying on lobbyists who can best predict the political conse-
quences of diﬀerent actions. Hall (2000) argues that a legislator gives access
to organized interests because they give informational subsidies: lobbyists se-
lectively subsidize the information and legislative labor costs of members who
already agree with them. Lobbyists thereby make it easier for a legislator to
advance a policy objective he has in common with the group. Several other
papers model legislators who aim to take positions popular in their districts,
and groups who provide private information to legislators (see Austen-Smith
(1993) and Rasmussen (1993)).
My approach oﬀers a new explanation for access. Rather than examining
how a ﬁrm attempts to inﬂuence the government oﬃcial, I show how a ﬁrm
and an oﬃcial can both beneﬁt from knowing each other’s beliefs. That can
explain why contributions often take the form of meetings or of lectures.
3 Assumptions
3.1 Projects
The state of nature is either good or bad. The prior probability that the
state of nature is good is γ. In period 1 the committee (or the agency for
which it works) decides whether to invest in a project, and each ﬁrm can also
make an investment. The agency’s investment costs K. A ﬁrm’s investment
costs Ki. The return from the investment has two parts. The public return
is R0 if the agency invested and the ﬁrm invested, and the state of nature
is good. The public return is zero otherwise. The ﬁrm earns Ri if the ﬁrm
invested, and the agency invested, and the state of nature is good. Otherwise
the ﬁrm earns nothing. Notice that these assumptions imply that a ﬁrm’s
expected proﬁts from investment increase with its conﬁdence that the agency
6will invest.
3.2 Committee
The agency’s decision is made by a committee consisting of n members.
The committee must decide whether to undertake a proposed project. Each
committee member sees a private signal of the state of nature. The signal he
sees is correct with probability s, with s1/2. The larger is s, the greater the
agreement among the committee members.
3.3 Firm
The one ﬁrm I consider proﬁts from investing in period 1 only if the state
of nature in period 2 is good, and the agency invests; when the ﬁrm decides
whether to invest it does not observe the agency’s decision. Thus, the ﬁrm’s
expected proﬁts are higher the better it can predict the agency’s action. The
ﬁrm can hear from one committee member his beliefs about the state of
nature.
4 Committee aware of what ﬁrm heard
The optimal decisions of both the ﬁrm and of the agency depend on what
they know about the ﬁrm’s information. For if the agency knows whether
the ﬁrm heard from a committee member who saw a good signal or instead
a bad signal, it knows what the ﬁrm will do. But if the agency does not
know what the ﬁrm heard, it cannot be sure that the ﬁrm will invest when
the agency does, and so investment by the agency is unattractive. I shall
consider these two cases in turn, considering ﬁrst a committee which knows
what the ﬁrm heard.
4.1 One committee member
The simplest case has a committee with one member. That is, a single
executive sees a signal of the state of nature and decides whether the agency
will invest. With probability s when the executive sees a signal for the
good state of nature (for brevity, a good signal), his signal is correct. The
probability that the committee member sees a good signal is γs+(1−γ)(1−s).
7The probability that the state of nature is good given that he saw a good
signal is
sγ
sγ + (1 − s)(1 − γ)
. (1)
If the agency invests and the ﬁrm invests after hearing that the executive
saw a good signal, then the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt is Ri
sγ
sγ+(1−s)(1−γ)−Ki. The
agency invests if K +Ki <
sγ
sγ+(1−s)(1−γ)(R+Ri). When this condition holds,
expected social welfare is
γs(−K − Ki + R + Ri) + (1 − γ)(1 − s)(−K − Ki). (2)
4.2 Three committee members
Now suppose the committee has three members, which makes a decision by
majority vote. The probability that the committee correctly estimates the
state of nature is the probability that 2 or more members correctly estimate
it.
Assume the ﬁrm hears from one committee member, who saw a good
signal, and the committee knows that the ﬁrm heard about this signal. Notice
the tradeoﬀ here. The larger the committee, the more likely will the agency
correctly predict the state of nature, making the investment more attractive.
But the larger the committee, the less accurate is the ﬁrm’s prediction of the
agency’s decision.
Consider a ﬁrm which heard from a committee member who saw a good
signal. Suppose the committee adopts the project (or invests) if a majority
saw a good signal. The probability that the majority saw a good signal is
the probability that one other or two other committee members saw a good
signal. The probability that 2 committee members saw a good signal given
that a particular member did is
s2 ≡
2s2γ(1 − s)





sγ + (1 − s)(1 − γ)
!
s(1 − s). (3)
. The probability that 3 committee members saw a good signal given that a
particular member did is
s3 ≡
s3γ









8If the ﬁrm heard from a committee member who saw a good signal, the
probability that it will earn Ri from investing is the conditional probability
that the agency invests and that the state of nature is good. Therefore, the
ﬁrm will invest if
Ki < Ri
sγ
sγ + (1 − s)(1 − γ)
(s2 + s3). (5)
4.2.1 Social welfare
Consider next expected social welfare. Recall that I consider a committee
which knows that the ﬁrm heard from a member who saw a good signal.
The agency invests if two or three of its members saw a good signal. The
probability that the state of nature is good given that two members saw a
good signal and one saw a bad signal is
γ2 ≡
3s2(1 − s)γ
3s2(1 − s)γ + 3(1 − s)2s(1 − γ)
. (6)
The probability that the state of nature is good given that three members
saw a good signal is
γ3 ≡
s3γ
s3γ + (1 − s)3(1 − γ)
. (7)
Suppose the agency invests when at least two of its members saw a good
signal, and it knows that the ﬁrm heard from a member who saw a good
signal, and it knows that the ﬁrm invests. Consider expected aggregate
welfare when the committee knows that the ﬁrm heard from a member who
saw a good signal, and so the ﬁrm invests. Let sj be the probability that j
committee members saw a good signal given that a particular member did.
Let γj be the probability that the state of nature is good when j committee
members saw a good signal. Then expected aggregate welfare given that
the ﬁrm heard from a committee member who saw a good signal, and that
the ﬁrm invests, is −Ki − (s2 + s3)K + (R + Ri)(s2γ2 + s3γ3). The general
expression is complicated, but becomes simple in the limiting case where
s = 1/2 andγ = 1/2; expected welfare is then −Ki − 3
4K + 3
8(R + Ri).
Clearly, if the ﬁrm invests when it heard from a committee member who
saw a good signal, then social welfare is higher when the committee consists of
three people than when it consists of one person—an increase in the size of the
9committee increases the probability that the committee correctly estimates
the state of nature. Under a large committee, however, the ﬁrm may choose
not to invest. We saw that under a committee of size 1, a ﬁrm which heard





. But with a committee
of size 3, the ﬁrm must consider the probability that the agency will invest
when the ﬁrm heard from a committee member who saw a good signal. The
probability that the committee will invest is the probability that at least one
other committee member saw a good signal, namely s2 + s3, or
3s2(1 − s)γ
3s2(1 − s)γ + 3(1 − s)2s(1 − γ)
+
s3γ
s3γ + (1 − s)3(1 − γ)
. (8)
A ﬁrm which heard from one committee member who saw a good signal
will invest if Ki is less than Ri times the probability that the agency invests
and that the state of nature is good, or if
Ki < Ri(s2γ2 + s3γ3). (9)






determines whether the ﬁrm will invest when the committee has one mem-
ber). The diﬀerence between the two expressions is
(1−s)2sγ
γ+s−2sγ−1, which is neg-
ative for s > 1/2. That is, with a committee of 3 the ﬁrm’s uncertainty
about the committee’s decision can make the ﬁrm avoid investment, though
it would invest if the committee had one member. And, of course, if the
ﬁrm does not invest, social welfare is zero. Here, then, a single executive is
superior to decision by committee.
The agency has yet another alternative. It may choose to invest even if
only one member saw a good signal. Using the same reasoning as before,
such a rule can induce the ﬁrm to invest when it would not were the agency
to follow a rule of investing only when a majority of the members saw a
good signal. That is, the agency may invest even though it knows that in a
particular case the investment will likely generate a negative return.
4.3 Large committee
Consider an indeﬁnitely large committee. If the ﬁrm knows that a committee
member saw a good signal, and that the committee decides by majority vote,
then a ﬁrm which heard of a good signal estimates the probability that the
committee will favor the investment as the probability that the state of nature
10is good given that the signal observed by the committee member was good.




sγ + (1 − s)(1 − γ)
!
. (10)
Expected welfare when the committee knows what the ﬁrm heard, and when
the ﬁrm invests if it heard of a good signal, is then γs(−K −Ki +R+Ri)−
(1 − γ)(1 − s)Ki. Notice that the condition here for the ﬁrm to invest is the
same as under a committee of one: under a committee of one, the ﬁrm knows
what the agency will do, but doesn’t know what the state of nature will be
when the agency invests; under a very large committee, the ﬁrm is uncertain
about what the agency will do, but knows that the agency will invest only if
the state of nature is good. So though the ﬁrm’s investment decision is the
same under a committee of size 1 and under a very large committee, social
welfare is necessarily higher under a very large committee—the agency never
invests when the state of nature is bad. Recall that under a committee of
size 3, the ﬁrm which heard of a good signal may choose not to invest though
it would invest under a committee of size 1. Social welfare is therefore not
a monotonic function of committee size: an increase of the committee size
from 1 to 3 may reduce social welfare, but a further increase to a large size
can increase it.
5 Committee unaware of what ﬁrm heard
I so far supposed that that the committee knows what the ﬁrm heard—
whether the ﬁrm heard from a committee member who saw a good signal or
who saw a bad signal. Here I shall consider the opposite assumption—the
committee does not know what the ﬁrm heard. Suppose, in particular, that
the ﬁrm heard from a committee member chosen at random from all com-
mittee members. For simplicity, I will consider a large committee. With a
probability approaching 1, when the majority of the committee saw a good
signal, a fraction s of the members saw a good signal. Thus, with probability
s the ﬁrm heard from a committee member who had seen a good signal. Sim-
ilarly, when a majority of the committee saw a bad signal, with probability
s the ﬁrm heard from a committee member who saw a bad signal. Thus, if
the ﬁrm invests when it hears of a good signal, and if the majority of the
11committee saw a good signal, then expected welfare is
γ(−K + s(−Ki + R + Ri)) − (1 − γ)(1 − s)Ki. (11)
Comparing social welfare when the committee does know and does not know
what the ﬁrm heard gives the beneﬁts of such knowledge, γK(1 − s). This
positive value is a beneﬁt the agency gains from giving access to the ﬁrm,
which allows the committee to learn what the ﬁrm heard. This informational
eﬀect relates to other work that sees lobbyists as providing valuable informa-
tion to a governmental oﬃcial. But the ﬂavor here diﬀers, focusing on what
the lobbyist knows, rather than on the lobbyist attempting to persuade the
governmental oﬃcial.
As I showed above, access can also prove beneﬁcial because it informs
a ﬁrm about the agency’s intentions. Such information can be provided in
other ways. Thus, Congressional oversight committees are sometimes viewed
as greatly inﬂuencing an agency’s policies, with public hearings one mech-
anism through which such inﬂuence is exerted. I view oversight hearings
as generating an additional beneﬁt—they inform Congress and the public
of what the agency is likely to do. Public speeches or announcements by
the agency heads cannot substitute for oversight hearings: in hearings the
agenda is set by Congress, rather than by the oﬃcial who may not know
what interests Congress and the public. Similarly, Congressional conﬁrma-
tion hearings for an oﬃcial who will head an agency or participate on a
decision-making committee not only can inform the public about what the
committee member’s positions will be.
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156 Notation
n Size of committee
Ri Return to ﬁrm when it invests and state of nature is good
R Public return to agency when it invests and state of nature is good
s Probability signal is correct
γ Prior probability that state of nature is good.
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